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Abstract 
 
In this work we examine the relationship between research performance, age, and 
seniority in academic rank of full professors in the Italian academic system. Differently 
from a large part of the previous literature, our results generally show a negative 
monotonic relationship between age and research performance, in all the disciplines 
under analysis. We also highlight a positive relationship between seniority in rank and 
performance, occurring particularly in certain disciplines. While in Medicine, Biology 
and Chemistry this result could be explained by the “accumulative advantage” effect, in 
other disciplines, like Civil engineering and Pedagogy and Psychology, it could be due 
to the existence of a large performance differential between young and mature 
researchers, at the moment of the promotion to full professors. These results, witnessed 
both generally and at the level of the individual disciplines, offer useful insights for 
policy makers and academia administrators on the role of older professors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades many of the Western nations’ university systems have experienced 
periods of contraction in faculty recruitment, with the resulting progressive aging of 
their research personnel (Kyvik and Olsen, 2008; Kyvik, 1990; Bayer and Dutton, 
1977). This has stimulated increased interest in investigation of the effects of the 
advancing age of researchers on their performance (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003; Levin 
and Stephan, 1989; Cole, 1979). One might expect that the researchers’ level of 
experience could increase with age (Gingras et al., 2008), but in contrast aging could 
also weigh negatively on the individuals’ cognitive capacities (Giambra et al., 1995) and 
increase the risks for the obsolescence of their knowledge and the loss of interest in 
research activity (Stephan and Levin, 1992; Price et al., 1975). The empirical studies of 
the age/performance relationship thus far reported have often furnished contrasting 
results, which hampers the development of unequivocal indications for policy (Stroebe, 
2010). 
In this work we analyze the combined effects of age and seniority in rank on the 
research performance of full professors in Italy, whereby universities are mostly public, 
competition is scarce and incentive systems insufficient to foster continuous 
improvements. Our field of observation concerns professors carrying out research in 
fields where bibliometric techniques can be applied to the measurement of research 
performance. The dataset, notably broader than previous studies of this kind, consists of 
11,989 Italian full professors, who represent 93.6% of the relevant population. The dates 
of birth of assistant and associate professors were not available to us. Indeed, by 
focusing on full professors we are able to partly control for the influence of academic 
rank on level of scientific performance, given that increasing rank corresponds with a 
general increase in the assets available for research activity, in the form of physical, 
financial, human or relational resources (Mishra and Smyth, 2013; Abramo et al., 2011; 
Bozeman and Gaughan, 2011). In addition, concentrating on full professors permits 
control for the impact of motivational factors exogenous to aging, such as the ambition 
to attain higher academic rank, which can induce greater productivity (Tien and 
Blackburn, 1996). The analysis of Italian universities also permits control for economic 
motivations, since national legislation imposes that all salaries are set according to the 
same scale of academic rank and seniority, thus making the professors’ income 
completely independent of their individual scientific performance. 
Another specificity of the current work is the use, for the measure of research 
performance, of a sophisticated indicator of research productivity, embedding quantity, 
impact and relative contribution to output. However the analyses are also conducted for 
three other indicators previously applied in the literature: one concerning only quantity 
(total number of the researcher’s publications) and two for impact alone  the prestige 
of the publishing journal as measured by impact factor (IF), and the articles’ impact 
measured by the number of citations received. We adopt a measurement method based 
on comparative evaluation of performance by academics in the same field and in the 
same academic rank, starting from publications indexed in the Web of Science (WoS). 
Each professor is first classified in his or her respective field of research, then the 
performance is compared with that of the other full professors in the same field, in order 
to avoid distortions due to the different intensity of publications across fields (Abramo 
et al., 2008; Butler, 2007; Garfield, 1979). The resort to this classification reduces the 
direct comparability of our results with those of the preceding literature, but certainly 
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renders them more precise. At the same time, it permits recognition of potential 
differences across the 11 disciplines of analysis. In fact the relation between age and 
performance can vary across disciplines, given the different patterns of publication 
(Bayer and Dutton, 1977; Pfeffer et al., 1976) and the different rates of knowledge 
obsolescence (Levin and Stephan, 1989; van Heeringen and Dijkwel, 1987). Finally, the 
different disciplines could register different relations between age and performance due 
to the effects foreseen under the “accumulative advantage hypothesis” (Allison and 
Stewart, 1974; Cole and Cole, 1973). According to the hypothesis, the prestige acquired 
with early career progression should induce the maintenance or increase of the 
individuals’ performance in subsequent years, in part due to the resources obtained 
through their enhanced reputation (Kyvik, 1990; Cole, 1979). The effects foreseen due 
to “accumulative advantage” can be different in the diverse disciplines due to the 
specific manner in which the prestige of researchers is evaluated (Allison and Stewart, 
1974), as can likewise vary the capacities to access and exploit various critical resources 
for research and the successive publication of results (Knorr and Mittermeir, 1980). To 
evaluate the effects traceable to the accumulative advantage hypothesis in relation to the 
different disciplines, in this study we will examine the impact on performance, not only 
of the age of full professors, but also of their seniority in rank. 
Because of limited availability of WoS raw data on Italian publications, we adopted 
a cross-sectional type of analysis, observing the period 2006-2010. Longitudinal 
analysis seems preferable because in principle it can trace the performance of the 
individual along his or her whole career, while cross-sectional analysis can only 
compare different individuals of different ages. However the second can control for the 
changing research environment which can notably affect performance. 
In the following section we discuss the relevant literature on aging and research 
performance, and in Section 3 we present the methodology for the current study. 
Section 4 illustrates the results obtained, while in Section 5 we propose future research 
directions and suggest several policy indications. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Research in the psychological fields has at this point conclusively demonstrated that 
aging reduces certain cognitive capacities essential to researchers, such as word fluency, 
attention, visual motor memory, and discrimination (Schaie, 1994). Still, the decline in 
these capacities only begins in a significant manner at around age 80 (Stroebe, 2010). 
Since the vast majority of researchers retire before then, biological aging should have 
very limited impact on performance. Although we note that the large part of outstanding 
discoveries, as those recognized by the Nobel Prize, are made when the researcher is 
under age 45 (Dietrich and Srinivasan, 2007; Lehman, 1953), more extensive inquiries 
have often given contrasting and inconclusive results on the relation between age and 
research performance. The lack of unanimity in findings is observed both in 
longitudinal (Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011; Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007) 
and in cross-sectional types of analyses. In the cross-sectional analyses, discrepancies 
are observed both in whether there are one or two peaks in performance as age proceeds 
(Kyvik, 1990; Bayer and Dutton, 1977) – the relation between age and performance is 
often non-linear (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Bayer and Dutton, 1977) – and in the age at 
which these peaks take place (40, 50 or even 60 years) (Gingras et al., 2008; Kyvik, 
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1990; Stern, 1978). It is notable that due to the limitations in their datasets, these studies 
investigate the effect of aging in a manner that fails to account for the fact of researchers 
potentially belonging to different cohorts (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Lawrence and 
Blackburn, 1988). Researchers from the same cohort share a history of education, 
values and motivations that may be quite different from those of other cohorts and 
which may notably affect their levels of productivity (Lawrence and Blackburn, 1985; 
Bayer and Dutton, 1977). In addition, each cohort of researchers will begin research 
activity in a given period, characterized by the current level of knowledge matured 
within the discipline, which in turn influences both the cohort’s ongoing levels of 
productivity and risks of ultimate obsolescence (Levin and Stephan, 1989; Mincer, 
1974). The period when a cohort first undertakes its research activity is also 
characterised by given amounts of available resources, by unique situations in the 
academic labor market, and even in alternative professions, which can influence levels 
of individual motivation (Levin and Stephan, 1991). A particular case such as this is that 
today’s younger researchers are being hired and promoted in a period characterized by 
greater selectivity, compared to previous eras when it was still possible to initiate a 
faculty career without having matured an international-level scientific curriculum 
(Kyvik and Olsen, 2008). These factors could offer a partial explanation of why several 
studies have observed lesser productivity in older cohorts (Levin and Stephan, 1989; 
Kyvik, 1990). Differently, other cross-sectional studies have given contrary indications, 
meaning results showing that younger researchers are less productive than older cohorts 
(Gingras et al., 2008; Bayer and Dutton, 1977). However these studies consider samples 
of researchers belonging to all academic ranks, which can be a cause of selection bias, 
since the youngest cohorts will include very large percentages of researchers in early 
career stages, a number of whom will abandon research altogether as their personal 
situation becomes more clear (Gingras et al., 2008; Levin and Stephan, 1991; Cole, 
1979). Since our research focuses on full professors, who have already matured a level 
of productivity and are generally unwilling to exit the university system, we propose to 
validate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1. In the Italian academic system there exists a monotonic negative relation 
between the productivity and the age of full professors. 
 
The conflicting results obtained from cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses have 
prevented definition of a broadly agreed model for the changes in productivity over 
researchers’ life stages. One of the models having greatest success is that developed by 
Simonton (1997), which shows how the growth and subsequent decrease in researcher 
productivity could be due to two opposite effects that vary with career seniority2. On the 
one hand, there is the continuing erosion of the researchers’ baggage of innovate ideas, 
linked to the fact that the academics’ rising career seniority will also be accompanied by 
increasing risks of obsolescence in their knowledge base (Price et al., 1975) and 
increased difficulty in reorienting towards new research themes (Stephan and Levin, 
1992). On the other hand the individual’s experience will increase, leading to greater 
knowledge of their discipline and its typical problems (Gingras et al., 2008), increased 
                                                          
2 In general, seniority in career can be considered as a good proxy of age, since the large part of 
researchers tends to commence their careers at the same age. Various studies show that the two variables 
(career seniority, age) are highly correlated (Over, 1988; Bayer and Dutton, 1977). Because of this 
correlation, in this work by “older cohort” we mean both by age and by entry into the academic system. 
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effectiveness in direction of laboratory and research teams (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 
2003; Lawrence and Blackburn, 1988), and improved probabilities of obtaining 
financing (Larivière et al., 2011; Cole, 1992). 
However, Simonton’s model (1997) does not take account of the role of motivation 
in the productivity levels registered over the researcher’s different career stages 
(Stroebe, 2010). Various economists hold that the observed decreases in productivity 
are essentially due to the fact that, as the academics’ ages increase and their retirement 
nears, they become less motivated to carry out research, and prefer to devote themselves 
to other activities that maximize the expected total incomes that they might gain (Kyvik 
and Olsen, 2008 Diamond, 1984). Still, motivation levels do not depend only on nearing 
retirement, but also on other factors linked to age in a less direct manner, such as the 
desire to develop and maintain a professional reputation, which could serve to assist 
entry into prestigious institutions, or for recognitions such as the keynote speaker role at 
congresses, or in order to increase the numbers or quality of the professor’s students 
(Stroebe, 2010; Butler and Cantrell, 1989). All these forms of motivation, particularly 
those independent of external incentivizing mechanisms (Hunter and Kuh, 1987; 
Finkelstein, 1984), evolve in different ways, but with advancing age tend to increase the 
differential in productivity between star scientists and other researchers, as foreseen 
under the accumulative advantage theory (Cole and Cole, 1973). Indeed with increasing 
age, star scientists register yet more productivity growth, due to the accumulation of 
resources obtained through previous performance (Cole, 1979; Allison and Stewart, 
1974). The resources accumulated can be reputational3, relational or financial in 
character, and can support the researcher in accomplishment of more advanced studies, 
while also inducing continued activity in order to still further increment prestige (Kyvik, 
1990). On the other hand, there is a drop in productivity among researchers who reach 
an intermediate stage in their career and at that point realize they will never achieve 
notable recognition among their peers (Lawrence and Blackburn, 1985; Allison and 
Stewart, 1974). 
Over time, even academics that previously reached high levels of productivity can 
experience declining motivation for research activity, for example when possibilities for 
promotion decrease (Tien, 2000; Kyvik, 1990). In fact various empirical studies 
document an increase researchers’ productivity prior to their promotion, followed by a 
decrease once the new position is attained (Turner and Mairesse, 2005; Lawrence and 
Blackburn, 1985). Other studies have demonstrated that once researchers have gone 
beyond a certain seniority in a given rank they tend to produce less, because they 
develop the conviction that they will never succeed in reaching any higher rank 
(Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011; Tien and Blackburn, 1996). In this regard, it is 
notable that star scientists tend to have lesser seniority in rank compared to other 
scientists (Costas et al., 2010), and that the latter register variation in productivity 
inverse to their seniority in rank (Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011). The impact of 
promotion and seniority in rank are also observed as being uniquely different for full 
professors, who having reached the maximum rank can no longer aspire to further 
promotion. On average, full professors maintain or reinforce their personal productivity 
even in the first years after promotion (Lawrence and Blackburn, 1985; Blackburn et al., 
1978; Katz, 1973), resulting as more productive compared to researchers in other ranks 
(Abramo et al., 2011; Puuska, 2010; Tien and Blackburn, 1996). In keeping with the 
                                                          
3 The “Matthew effect” itself (Merton, 1968) can be the result of the reputation earned by star scientists.  
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accumulative advantage hypothesis, the trend in productivity for full professors could be 
due to the greater accumulation of material and financial resources at their disposal 
(Mishra and Smyth, 2013; Abramo et al., 2011; Blackburn et al., 1978), as well as their 
greater capacity to activate collaborations (Abramo et al., 2014b; Bozeman and 
Gaughan, 2011). Further, full professors are induced to maintain and improve their 
productivity in order to protect the prestige obtained through their previous performance 
(Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011; Puuska, 2010). Accumulative advantage 
hypothesis contributes an explanation of why full professors who are nominated at 
young age, and for years have maintained their reputations and had access to greater 
resources, obtain levels of post-promotion productivity that are higher than for their 
colleagues promoted in later age (Turner and Mairesse, 2005). This mechanism is 
obviously seen primarily in meritocratic systems, such as in highly prestigious 
universities where promotion is strongly linked to the candidates’ demonstrated 
productivity levels (Finkelstein, 1984; Blackburn et al., 1978). The accumulative 
advantage hypothesis also contributes to explaining why full professors demonstrate the 
greatest heterogeneity in levels of post-promotion productivity (Tien and Blackburn, 
1996), since this is in turn linked to previous productivity (Hedley, 1987). In fact less 
productive full professors tend to concentrate on teaching and administrative activity 
(Hedley, 1987; Stern, 1978), especially when they assume governance positions within 
their own institutions (Zuckerman and Merton, 1972), because they tend to develop 
greater affinity with the home institution rather than with their broader discipline 
(Lawrence and Blackburn, 1985). Differently, star scientists maintain or increase their 
personal productivity even after promotion to full professor, because rather than 
depending on further monetary incentives, they seem more motivated by their intrinsic 
“sacred spark” and the will to preserve their reputation within their scientific 
community (Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011). Beginning from these results as 
presented in the literature, we propose to validate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. In keeping with the accumulative advantage hypothesis, in the Italian academic 
system there exists a positive relation between productivity of full professors and their 
seniority in rank. 
 
In interpreting the empirical evidence on the relations between age, seniority in rank 
and performance, we should recall that performance has been measured by different 
bibliometric indicators, ranging from the number of publications, to number of citations, 
to impact factor of the publishing journals. A number of studies have analyzed 
indicators of both publication quantity and impact for the same populations, 
demonstrating different relations with age (Kelchtermans, and Veugelers, 2011; Levin 
and Stephan, 1989), but the results obtained do not permit definitive conclusions. 
The relation between age, seniority in rank and performance might be influenced by 
such factors as the professor’s gender, discipline and university type. The effects of 
such other factors then need to be controlled for. 
The relation between productivity and age could vary according to the discipline 
considered, because publication patterns vary between disciplines, due to the different 
working methods adopted (Kyvik, 1990; Bayer and Dutton, 1977), as well to the 
different orientations of the various academic communities in codifying scientific 
advancements (Pfeffer et al., 1976). These specificities can determine a different impact 
of the accumulative advantage effect in the individual disciplines, where it is not only 
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the different manners in which the prestige of the researcher is recognized (Allison and 
Stewart, 1974), but also the capacity to access and exploit certain resources critical to 
research activity and the diffusion of its results (Knorr and Mittermeir, 1980). Further, 
the different relations between productivity and age that are registered between the 
various disciplines depend also on the different rates of knowledge obsolescence in the 
various disciplines. In fact some studies (Kyvik, 1990; Levin and Stephan, 1989; van 
Heeringen and Dijkwel, 1987) have highlighted how in certain disciplines with a rapid 
rate of obsolescence, such as Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Earth sciences, there is a 
stronger decrease in productivity with age compared to other less “dynamic” disciplines, 
such as Economics and Mathematics. However in recent years, the relationship between 
age and productivity has tended to homogenize across the various disciplines (Costas et 
al., 2010; Shin and Cummings, 2010; Kyvik and Olsen, 2008). 
The gender of researchers can also play a notable role in the relation between 
productivity and age. In fact women tend to publish less in the first stage of their career 
(Long, 1992; McDowell, 1982), because of motherhood and the fact that other family 
responsibilities are often primarily born by women (Larivière et al., 2011; Kyvik and 
Teigen, 1996). According to some studies (Kyvik and Teigen, 1996), women 
researchers then subsequently reach a level of productivity very close to that of their 
male colleagues, while other studies would show that the gap in productivity between 
the genders remains constant (Larivière et al., 2011). The differences in these analytical 
results could be due to the fact that the two genders demonstrate very different 
distributions of productivity. Particularly after 10 years of their career, the least 
productive women researchers tend to produce more than their least productive male 
colleagues, while male star scientists continue to produce more compared to women in 
general (Abramo et al., 2009a; Long, 1992). 
The empirical evidence noted, regarding forms of variability between disciplines and 
genders, stimulates further consideration of the impact of these factors in the analysis of 
the relations between productivity, age and seniority in rank. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data sources and field of observation 
 
A brief presentation of several characteristics of the Italian university system assists 
in interpreting our research results. The Italian Ministry of Education, Universities and 
Research (MIUR) recognizes a total of 96 universities as having the authority to issue 
legally-recognized degrees. 94.9% of Italian faculty are employed in the public 
universities (67). In keeping with the Humboldtian model, there are no ‘teaching-only’ 
universities in Italy, as all professors are required to carry out both research and 
teaching. All new academics enter the university system through national competitions, 
and career advancement can only proceed by further public competition. The 
promotions are based on the judgments of committees selected from the existing full 
professors of the SDSs in question. Differently from associate professors, full professors 
are eligible to such high level positions as director of schools, departments, PhD 
programs, etc. They often manage the allocation of resources which affect individuals’ 
research productivity. Moreover as mentor for young researchers, they represent a “role 
model”, influencing their behavior (Pezzoni et al., 2012). 
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Each academic is classified in one and only one research field, named Scientific 
Disciplinary Sector (SDS), of which there are 3704, grouped in 14 disciplines, named 
University Disciplinary Areas (UDAs). The dataset of Italian professors used in our 
analysis has been extracted from a database5 maintained by the MIUR. The database 
indexes names, academic rank, affiliation, and SDS of all academics in Italian 
universities. The analysis is limited to the fields where bibliometrics can be applied. 
Thus we restricted the field of observation to those SDSs (198 in all) where in the five-
year period under examination, at least 50% of professors (assistant, associate, and full) 
achieved at least one publication indexed in the WoS. 
The identification of the age and seniority in rank of the full professors was obtained 
through analysis of lists compiled by the MIUR in 2004, showing the national 
academics with the right to vote in elections for members in the above-noted career-
advancement committees. Since 2008 full professors only have been eligible to be 
members of career-advancement committees. For this reason, coverage of other 
academic ranks is insufficient for robust analyses. From these lists we identified the 
birth dates and dates of appointment to full professor for 11,989 academics, representing 
93.6% of the total population of full professors active in the 2006-2010 period, in the 
198 SDSs of the field of observation. Table 1 shows that the level of coverage is 
essentially balanced across the different disciplines, with a minimum of 87% in Earth 
sciences and a maximum of 98% in Economics and statistics6. Missing data refer to 
professors in very small-sized SDSs, where career advancement competitions have not 
been launched recently, or to professors who retired before 2010, and were not eligible 
to vote for evaluation committee members. In general missing data refer mainly to full 
professors older than the ones analyzed. The average age of full professors as of 
31/12/2010 is roughly 58 years in Economics and statistics and over 64 years in 
Physics. The percentage of inactive full professors varies from slightly over 6% in 
Physics to over 35% in Economics and statistics. These differences are not necessarily 
attributable to a lesser emphasis on research on the part of the full professors belonging 
to any discipline, rather to the diverse patterns of publication that occur. In fact in some 
UDAs, such as Economics and statistics, Civil engineering, and Pedagogy and 
psychology, a relevant number of researchers tend to publish exclusively monographs or 
in national journals, which are not indexed by the WoS. 
Figure A1 in SM-Appendix A shows the age distribution for all full professors 
without distinguishing by discipline. From this we observe that less than 0.5% of full 
professors are less than age 41 and less than 12% are under age 51. In contrast more 
than 33% are over 65, with as many as 13% actually being over age 70. 
Figure A2 in SM-Appendix A presents the distribution of age at which the 
researchers in the dataset obtained appointment as full professor. We observe that more 
than 24% of researchers obtain appointment to this rank before age 41, while just under 
10% obtain the appointment after age 55. These results, combined with those on age, 
suggest that in the majority of cases, the seniority in rank for the full professors is 
greater than 10 years. On the other hand, the substantial percentage of researchers 
                                                          
4 The complete list is accessible on http://attiministeriali.miur.it/UserFiles/115.htm, last accessed January 
30, 2015. 
5 http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php, last accessed on January 30, 2015. 
6 The dataset is well-balanced over the individual SDSs given that out of the total 198 SDSs under 
examination, coverage drops below 67% for only 10 SDSs, where these are also among the smallest of 
the entire field of observation.  
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appointed to full professor at a young age seems to contrast with the results from 
Pezzoni et al. (2012), who suggest that seniority is an overriding criterion in the 
promotion of full professors in Italy. Analyzing the age of appointment to full professor 
by individual UDA, as presented in Table 2, we observe notable differences between the 
various disciplines. These differences are the fruit not only of different disciplinary 
publication patterns, but also of the autonomy granted under the Italian system to the 
individual SDSs for the definition of their relative promotion criteria. While the 
majority of the full professors in Mathematics and computer sciences are appointed 
before age 41, in Medicine this occurs in less than 10% of the cases. Economics and 
statistics, Civil engineering and Industrial and information engineering all show a trend 
similar to Mathematics and computer sciences, in regards to the percentages of full 
professors appointed in both young and advanced age. Agricultural and veterinary 
sciences, while again registering a low percentage of full professors appointed at 
advanced age, also shows a low percentage appointed at young age. In any case, to 
evaluate the role of age in the different UDAs, we will verify for the potential presence 
of a differential in productivity between researchers appointed in the same period, 
comparing between those appointed at young age and at advanced age. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of full professors in the dataset, by UDA 
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Medicine (MED) 2,953 2,798 94.75 62.87 49.10 8.50 
Industrial and information engineering (IIE) 1,981 1,837 92.73 58.83 43.64 14.08 
Biology (BIO) 1,689 1,606 95.09 62.34 45.83 7.10 
Mathematics and computer sciences (MAT) 1,120 1,090 97.32 58.51 40.57 13.75 
Chemistry (CHE) 1,095 981 89.59 63.24 46.88 4.02 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences (AVS) 1,034 928 89.75 60.63 46.27 13.44 
Physics (PHY) 918 844 91.94 64.04 46.95 6.43 
Economics and statistics (ECS) 726 714 98.35 57.97 42.60 35.40 
Civil engineering (CEN) 560 527 94.11 60.23 43.96 23.39 
Earth sciences (EAR) 434 379 87.33 63.55 47.17 14.29 
Pedagogy and psychology (PPS) 305 285 93.44 59.56 47.14 23.93 
Total 12,815 11,989 93.55 61.26 45.78 8.11 
 
Table 2: Age distribution at appointment to full professor, by UDA 
UDA 
Full professors appointed 
before 41 (%) 
Full professors appointed 
after 55 (%) 
Mathematics and computer sciences (MAT) 58.07 4.40 
Economics and statistics (ECS) 42.82 5.03 
Industrial and information engineering (IIE) 33.95 4.87 
Civil engineering (CEN) 33.78 6.26 
Biology (BIO) 22.86 9.40 
Pedagogy and psychology (PPS) 21.28 12.41 
Earth sciences (EAR) 20.60 14.29 
Chemistry (CHE) 18.47 14.12 
Physics (PHY) 17.44 9.96 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences (AVS) 15.71 7.08 
Medicine (MED) 9.47 17.26 
Total 25.05 10.10 
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3.2 Performance indicators 
 
To measure the research performance of the full professors we draw on the Italian 
Observatory of Public Research (ORP), a database developed and maintained by the 
authors and derived under license from the WoS. Beginning from the raw data of Italian 
publications indexed in WoS, and applying a complex algorithm for disambiguation of 
the true identity of the authors and their institutional affiliations (for details see 
D’Angelo et al., 2011), each publication7 is attributed to the university scientists (full, 
associate and assistant professors) that produced it, with a harmonic average of 
precision and recall (F-measure) equal to 96 (error of 4%). Beginning from this data we 
are able to calculate the performance indicators described below, for each full professor. 
To calculate them one needs to adopt a few simplifications and assumptions. It has been 
shown (Moed, 2005) that in the hard sciences the prevalent form of codification of 
research output is publication in scientific journals. The other forms of output which we 
neglect are often followed by publications that describe their content in the scientific 
arena, so the analysis of publications alone actually avoids a potential double counting. 
When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the production factors 
available to each scientist then one should normalize by them. Unfortunately relevant 
data are not available at individual level in Italy. The first assumption then is that the 
resources available to professors within the same field of observation are the same. The 
second assumption is that the hours devoted to research are more or less the same for all 
professors. Given the main traits of the Italian academic system, the above assumptions 
appear acceptable. 
To ensure satisfactory levels of reliability in the analyses (Abramo et al., 2012a), we 
measure research performance over a five-year period (2006-2010). We use four 
indicators of performance. 
The first (and most important, in our view) indicator of performance measured is the 
research productivity, through a proxy called Fractional Scientific Strength (FSS). In 
formula: 
 
 [1] 
Where: 
t = number of years of work of the professor in the period of observation; 
N = number of publications of the professor in the period of observation; 
 = citations received (at 31/12/2011) by publication i; 
 = average of the distribution of citations received for all cited publications8 indexed in 
the same year and subject category of publication i; 
 = fractional contribution of the professor to publication i. 
Fractional contribution equals the inverse of the number of authors, in those fields 
where the practice is to place the authors in simple alphabetical order, but assumes 
different weights in other cases. For the life sciences, widespread practice in Italy and 
                                                          
7 We exclude those document types that cannot be strictly considered as true research products, such as 
editorial material, conference abstracts, replies to letters, etc. 
8 Abramo et al. (2012b) demonstrate that the average of the distribution of citations received for all cited 
publications of the same year and subject category is the most effective scaling factor. 
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abroad is for the authors to indicate the various contributions to the published research 
by the order of the names in the byline. For these areas, we give different weights to 
each co-author according to their order in the byline and the character of the co-
authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural). If first and last authors belong to the same 
university, 40% of citations are attributed to each of them; the remaining 20% are 
divided among all other authors. If the first two and last two authors belong to different 
universities, 30% of citations are attributed to first and last authors; 15% of citations are 
attributed to second and last but one author; the remaining 10% are divided among all 
others9. We do not use a fixed-forward citation window as is customary in studies of 
this kind, rather we prefer to field-normalize citations by year. Although the evaluation 
of impact of more recent publications is less robust, in this way we avoid the possible 
distortions in favor of more recent publications due to the increasing size of the 
population of potential citing articles. 
Differently from other indicators of research performance, FSS embeds both 
quantity and impact of production, similarly to the h-index. However, differently from 
the h-index and most of its variants, it does not neglect the impact of works with a 
number of citations below h and all citations above h of the h-core works. It does not 
fail either to field-normalize citations, and to account for the number of co-authors and 
their order in the byline where appropriate. A thorough explanation of the theory and 
assumptions underlying FSS can be found in Abramo et al. (2013). 
To enable exploration of performance along its individual component dimensions, 
we also measure an indicator of output alone (P, Publications) and two indicators for 
impact, with one referring to average impact of the articles (IA, Impact of Articles) and 
the other to the prestige of the journals in which the professor publishes (IJ, Impact of 
Journals). In formulae: 
 
 [2] 
 
 [3] 
 
 [4] 
Where: 
t, N,  and  are the same as above; 
= impact factor of the journal of publication i; 
 = average of the distribution of impact factors for all journals of publication i. 
The indicators calculated for each scientist are expressed on a percentile scale (0-
100, worst to best) for comparison with the performance of all Italian colleagues (full 
professors) of the same SDS. This allows to avoid distortions due to the varying 
intensity of publications across fields (Abramo et al., 2013; Sandström and Sandström, 
2009; Zitt et al., 2005). 
                                                          
9 The weighting values were assigned following advice from senior Italian professors in the life sciences. 
The values could be changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
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To analyze the impact of age and seniority in rank on research performance we 
assume the follow model of analysis: 
 
Performance = f(Age, Seniority, Gender, U1, U2, U3) [5] 
 
where Performance is the indicator of research performance, Age is the age of the 
professor measured at 31/12/2010, Seniority is the seniority in rank measured at the 
same moment, Gender takes value of 1 if the professor is male and 0 if female. Finally, 
the variables Uj identify the typology of the professor’s home university as of 
31/12/2010. The importance of the home university type is shown by preceding studies 
on the relationship between age and performance (Joy, 2006; Blackburn et al., 1978). In 
keeping with Tien (2000) and Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso (2007), we distinguish 
between private universities (U1) and public ones. In keeping with Shin and Cummings 
(2010), we also distinguish the universities that are primarily dedicated to research. 
Although all universities in the Italian system are obligated to conduct research, the 
Schools for Advanced Studies are unique for their much greater concentration on 
research, as well as being generally recognized for excellence. Previous research has in 
fact demonstrated that the average productivity of full professors belonging to these 
schools (U2) is greater than for the rest of the population (Abramo et al., 2014a). 
Finally, U3 indicates those full professors belonging to a polytechnic, meaning a 
university primarily specialized in the engineering disciplines. The analysis of the 
impact of Age and Seniority in rank on research performance of full professors is 
conducted both at the general level and the level of the individual UDAs in order to take 
account of the impact of the discipline, as discussed above. 
Because our performance indicators can be easily transformed into fractional 
variables, the estimate of the productivity function is obtained by a Quasi-Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (QMLE) in the standard logit framework, as previously 
suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). In accordance with this approach, we 
estimate the non-linear model: 
 
E(Performance|x) = G( +  +  Seniority +  Gender + 1 U1 + 2 U2 
+ 3 U3) [6] 
 
where G() is the logistic function. The choice of a non-linear model is based on 
numerous studies in the literature (Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007; Bayer and 
Dutton, 1977) that demonstrate a non-linear relation between performance and age. The 
choice of polynomial degree was made by the minimization of the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973), which is one of the most diffused criterion for model 
selection in Generalized Linear Model (GLM) literature. Through these regressions we 
obtain coefficients, standard errors and average marginal effects that relate the 
explanatory variables to the performance indicator under investigation. We can thus 
evaluate the level of variance (pseudo R-squared) explained by our model (McFadden, 
1974). In all the regressions executed we have also checked for the absence of multi-
collinearity between the explanatory variables, omitting some of them as necessary. . 
Since the propensity of subjects to abandon or retire from university in the period 
under investigation is independent of their productivity, our analyses are not affected by 
selection bias. In fact, Italian legislation provides that up to a very advanced age, the 
choice of retirement for full professors is determined entirely by the individual. Since 
13 
the maximum threshold for compulsory retirement has changed several times over the 
past 40 years, we are not able to calculate the exact percentage of full professors that 
advance their retirement to an age earlier than the cut-off. Still, the fact that there is 
almost nil correlation between individual performance indicators and the effective 
retirement age of full professors10 suggests that research performance is not a 
determining factor in the choice to remain in the university system. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
To test the two working hypotheses formulated at the outset we first analyze the 
graphs of the four performance indicators (Section 3.2) related to varying Age and 
Seniority in rank. To draw the graphs we regroup the observations in classes of roughly 
equal numbers, for both Age and Seniority in rank, and for each class calculate the 
average percentiles for the performance indicators. Figures 1 and 2 provide graphs 
showing the trends for the four indicators, by class for Age and Seniority in rank. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that all four performance indicators register a continuous 
decline with respect to Age and Seniority. In particular, P and FSS show marked 
decreases, while the slopes for IJ and IA appear slightly less steep. This is due to the 
fact that the classes of full professors under Age 55 obtain better results in P and FSS 
compared to the cases for the other two indicators, while the “over-69” class shows 
inverted results. In the whole population of Italian full professors the performance 
should decrease more noticeably, as missing data refer mainly to older professors, who 
retired before 2010 and whose performances (we have measured them) is on average 
lower than that of our dataset. 
However the analysis of these graphs is insufficient to accept or reject the working 
hypotheses, both because Age and Seniority in rank are correlated between each other11 
and because the productivity levels also depend on other variables in the model (6). For 
this reason we conduct a series of QMLE regressions, as presented in Tables 3 to 6. 
Each table presents the regression results obtained for all four performance indicators 
(FSS, P, IA and IJ). The tables present the coefficients for the explanatory variables as 
obtained in the regressions implemented both on the total dataset (Total) and for each 
discipline12. We carried out the regressions at the SDS level in the UDA Physics, and 
observed that the relation between Performance, Age and Seniority in rank varies to a 
more or less extent across the SDSs. Because of space constraints in this work we show 
the results of the analysis at the UDA level. Because we apply the regressions to (almost 
total) population data, we do not indicate the significance level of the coefficients 
related to each variable. We report instead their standard errors, which give some 
descriptive information about the level of heterogeneity of the effects among the 
individual full professor. Furthermore, we report the average marginal effect of each 
variable, which is the mean of all marginal effects evaluated for each individual full 
                                                          
10 This correlation ranges from -0.06 (observed for the case IJ) to -0.09 (observed for the case P). 
11 At the general level, the correlation between Age and Seniority in rank is 0.7. Breaking down the 
dataset for professors in the different UDAs, we observe correlation levels between a minimum of 0.66 
(in Pedagogy and Psychology) and maximum 0.80 (Economics and statistics). In SM-Appendix B, we 
provide the complete correlation table for all the UDAs. In any case, as verified under several tests, the 
high levels of correlation between Age and Seniority do not cause problems of multi-collinearity in the 
regressions conducted. 
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professor; as for age, the average marginal effects are globally computed by considering 
all its polynomial degrees. The results concerning the variables proposed in the research 
hypotheses, age and seniority will be discussed in detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2; while 
in the following paragraphs we present the general results and the results concerning the 
control variables. 
The regressions show a low pseudo R-squared, consistently below 10% for all the 
performance indicators. There are only a few disciplines, such as Economics and 
statistics, and Civil engineering, where the variance explained by the statistical model 
rises above 5% for all the indicators. These results, in line with those from Bayer and 
Dutton (1977), could be due to the fact that at least some of the processes that influence 
the relation among performance, age and seniority are state-dependent (Stephan, 1996). 
 
Figure 1: Graphs of the four performance indicators (percentile) by age class 
 
 
Figure 2: Graphs of the four performance indicators (percentile) by class for seniority in rank 
 
 
Analyzing the individual explanatory variables, we observe that male gender tends 
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to have a positive impact on the four indicators, at both the general level and for the 
large part of the individual UDAs. Although the standard errors indicate a large 
heterogeneity in the population, the coefficients seem to show that male professors 
achieve better research performance. This observation is again in keeping with previous 
literature (Abramo et al., 2009b; Kyvik and Teigen, 1996; Long, 1992). 
For the variables concerning type of university, we observe that belonging to the 
Schools for Advance Studies has a homogeneous and highly positive impact on almost 
all the indicators and disciplines. This is due to a few distinctive characteristics of these 
Schools, which are specifically devoted to highly talented students, with very small 
faculties and tightly limited enrollment numbers per degree program (Abramo et al., 
2014c). However belonging to private university has homogeneous and highly positive 
impact only in Medicine, a fact that can be traced to the influence of a single university 
(Milan San Raffaele Vita-Salute University), which features exceptionally high 
performance in this one discipline. In spite of the focus on engineering, belonging to a 
polytechnic has a homogeneous and positive impact on only some of the indicators, and 
primarily in the Biology, Chemistry, and Pedagogy and psychology disciplines. 
The choice of the performance indicator seems to have only minimal effect on the 
relations observed, given that the average marginal effects of age, seniority and some of 
the other explanatory variables vary in a contained manner between the different 
indicators. In particular, the effect of seniority and the other control variables seems less 
dependent on the performance indicator. Age seems to have a higher negative effect on 
FSS and P, while differences between young and old full professors are less noticeable 
for the journals’ impact factor (IJ), and least noticeable for the average citation per 
article indicator (IA). These results differ from those by Levin and Stephan (1989), and 
by Carayol and Matt (2006), which show a higher negative impact of age on average 
impact factor than on number of publications. They also differ from those by Diamond 
(1986), and Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2011) which show a higher negative impact 
of age on average citations than on number of publications. Stern (1978) and Cole 
(1979) showed instead that in few disciplines average citations increase with age. 
Caution is always recommended though when comparing results of studies conducted 
with different approaches. For example, differently from previous studies, we measure 
individual performance as compared to that of peers in the same SDS, avoiding the 
distortions due to different intensity of publication across fields. 
 
 
4.1 Impact of age on research performance 
 
From Table 3, we see that the level of FSS almost always tends to decrease with 
increase in Age. In fact there is an inverse tendency only in the case of younger full 
professors in Chemistry (for Age < 44) and Medicine (Age < 48). The relation between 
FSS and Age is always homogeneous and is generally described by degree 1 or 2 
polynomials. Very similar results are also obtained for P (Table 4), where Age always 
has a negative effect except for full professors in Chemistry (Age < 44) and Medicine 
(Age < 49), for IA (Table 5) where Age always has negative effect except for full 
professors in Medicine (Age < 45) and for IJ (Table 6) where Age always has negative 
effect except for full professors in Industrial and information engineering (Age < 43) 
and in Medicine (Age < 43). Other than partially for some UDAs such as Medicine, 
Civil Engineering, and Chemistry, the negative impact of Age on research performance 
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seems confirmed, in keeping with hypothesis H1. A further confirmation of hypothesis 
H1 is obtained through the analysis of the Age of inactive full professors, which is 
almost always over 54 years, and in a quite homogenous manner among the different 
UDAs. 
The confirmation of hypothesis H1 also appears in line with previous cross-sectional 
analyses published in the literature, which show that in disciplines such as Biochemistry 
(Levin and Stephan, 1989), Chemistry (Cole, 1979), Psychology (Over, 1982) and 
Medicine (Shin and Cummings, 2010), the number of articles published over a given 
period of analysis tends to diminish in a trend similar to that shown in our own analyses, 
especially as concerns P. The results for the four indicators in Physics give indications 
similar to those recorded by Levin and Stephan (1989) in the same discipline, for the 
indicators of impact and quantity of publications. Beyond these specific cases of 
agreement with our analyses, the results of the studies cited and from other cross-
sectional studies (Kyvik, 1990; Over, 1988; Stern, 1978) are different from ours, above 
all because at times they show a lower performance for the range of lower ages. Rather 
than reflecting on the context analyzed, this difference is probably due to the fact that the 
samples used in the above studies embed a selection bias. These samples are 
characterized by the presence of an important percentage of young researchers who will 
likely abandon research precisely because they are unproductive, while in our analysis 
this problem is overcome by the focus on full professors only. In this case, the negative 
impact of Age on research performance could be attributed either to aging and changing 
personal interest or to the behavior of the cohort to which the full professor belongs, 
but, given the cross-sectional nature of our analysis, we are unable to achieve certainty 
in attributing this negative impact to either causes. If the hypothesis of lesser 
productivity in the older cohort were correct, such a phenomenon could be due to the 
greater risk of knowledge obsolescence experienced by the older cohort, or to the ever 
increasing promotion based on publications at the international level. The first 
explanation does not seem confirmed by the analysis of the relation between Age and 
performance in the individual UDAs. In fact analyzing the marginal effect of Age on the 
four indicators, the UDAs that show greater average marginal decrease are Civil 
engineering and Pedagogy and psychology. To our knowledge, these two disciplines 
seem less affected by obsolescence in comparison to others, such as Physics or Biology. 
The SDS classification of Italian professors allows for a fine-grained analysis at the 
SDS level within each UDA. Because of space constraints we report here the example 
of Physics, in particular those SDSs where the number of professors is large enough to 
allow for significant results (Table 713). The maximum negative impact of age on 
performance occurs in FIS/02 (Theoretical Physics, Mathematical Models and 
Methods). The minimum occurs instead in such “big science” fields as FIS/01 
(Experimental Physics), FIS/04 (Nuclear and Subnuclear Physics) and FIS/05 
(Astronomy and Astrophysics). The different collaboration behavior and co-authoring 
practices of scientists in the respective SDSs could in part explain the findings. In 
Experimental Physics, Nuclear and Subnuclear Physics, and Astronomy and 
Astrophysics, research projects generally see the collaboration of a number of research 
labs, which shows in the very high number of co-authors listed in the byline. The 
contribution to the project is generally intended as of the whole lab, independently of 
                                                          
13 The varying relation between age and performance across SDSs cannot be attributed to the conversion 
of the dependent variable FSS into percentile. As shown in Table 7, the coefficients of variation in each 
SDS are very close. 
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the varying contributions of single members. In such contexts, the impact of age is 
lessened. Differently, in Theoretical Physics, Mathematical Models and Methods, where 
the collaboration among labs is less stringent as a requisite to produce results, which 
shows in shorter authors’ lists, the impact of age on performance is more evident. 
Even though the cross-sectional nature of our analysis does not allow for a definitive 
conclusion, the analysis of the impact of Seniority, presented in the next section, serves 
in part to evaluate whether the lesser productivity of older cohorts is in fact due to the 
greater importance given to international scientific publication for promotion to full 
professor. 
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4.2 Impact of seniority on research performance 
 
As seen in Tables 3 to 6, Seniority generally impacts on research performance in a 
positive manner in all UDAs, with these exceptions: in Economics and statistics and in 
Mathematics and computer sciences, for all indicators; in Industrial and information 
engineering, for P; and in Earth sciences for IJ. These exceptions may be explained by 
the percentage of professors promoted before aging 41 which, as shown in Table 2, is 
highest in these UDAs. It seems that in Mathematics and Economics brilliant results are 
generally reached at young age more than at a later stage. Apart from these UDAs, 
results on Seniority seem to confirm hypothesis H2 and are thus in line with the 
cumulative advantage theory, which would indicate that researchers who are named full 
professor early in their career accumulate greater resources and maintain their 
reputation longer over time14. However unlike those for Age, in the majority of case the 
                                                          
14 The use of the seniority in rank of full-professors only, does not allow to account for any accumulative 
advantage earned beforehand. Unfortunately, we have no data on the seniority in rank as associate 
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standard errors of the coefficients for Seniority indicate a high heterogeneity in the 
population, and they always indicate a marginal effect that is less than the 
corresponding one for Age. This result, which limits the explanatory power of the 
accumulative advantage hypothesis, could be explained by detailing the analyses at the 
level of the individual UDA15. In fact, standard errors of the coefficients for Seniority 
indicate more homogeneity only in Civil engineering, Pedagogy and psychology, 
Medicine (for all the indicators), in Biology (for FSS, P and IJ) and in Chemistry (for 
FSS, P and IA). In some of these disciplines, in particular Medicine, Biology and 
Chemistry, this result could effectively be connected to the advantages anticipated under 
the accumulative advantage hypothesis. Indeed, it is in disciplines such as these that 
greater seniority in rank could facilitate the assignment of critical resources, such as the 
direction of hospital departments or research laboratories, which impact on productivity. 
For Civil engineering and Pedagogy and psychology, the explanation would seem more 
complex, although it is interesting to recall, as illustrated in the previous section, that 
these two UDAs registered maximum negative marginal effects for the Age variable. 
This could indicate, how especially in these two disciplines, there is a gap of 
productivity among older professors in favor of full professors promoted at a younger 
age. This gap could have increased along time, in keeping with heterogeneity of full 
professors’ productivity after promotion, as shown in other studies as well (Turner and 
Mairesse, 2005; Tien and Blackburn, 1996). 
In order to offer a better explanation of the link between research performance and 
Seniority in rank we have measured the different performances at time of promotion by 
repeating the same regression analysis on a more limited subset of individuals who were 
more recently appointed to full professor rank, specifically those with Seniority less 
than eight years16. In this manner we are able to show and extend what was indicated by 
Lissoni et al. (2011) and Pezzoni et al. (2012), who demonstrated that age and seniority 
in rank positively influence the probability of promotion (although not in a linear 
manner) for Physics researchers in France, and in still greater measure in Italy. In our 
analyses, since we consider a limited and recent period of appointment, the examination 
eliminates the effects linked to the changing national evaluation procedures and the 
increasing emphasis on international publications, as well as the ever-increasing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
professors. Our variable Seniority in rank represents then a proxy for the accumulative advantage of a 
professor. 
15 To better understand the impact of Seniority on the individual performance indicators, we have 
attempted to codify this variable in a different manner. Using a dummy variable for each year of 
appointment to full professor, we obtain results that are scarcely high except for certain years, however 
these do not seem to indicate any recognizable phenomenon in the processes of advancement. Using a 
dummy variable for the years in which the procedures in the competitions were the same, we do obtain 
some interesting results at the general level, however these are not at all unequivocal. In fact the analysis 
evidences that full professors appointed under the competition procedures in effect until 1973 would have 
better performance in terms of FSS and P, but worse in terms of IA and IJ, compared to their same-aged 
colleagues appointed under more recent procedures. The details of these analyses, which go beyond the 
scope of the current work, are available from the authors on request.  
16 The full professors with under eight years Seniority are the ones who were appointed or confirmed to 
this rank during the period under examination (2006-2010). Comparing their performance to that of the 
other full professors in the dataset, the recently-promoted subset shows higher performance under all 
indicators, in keeping with previous reports in the literature (Turner and Mairesse, 2005; Lawrence and 
Blackburn, 1985). Verifying such a statement as a proper hypothesis is clearly beyond the scope of the 
current study and would require more refined analyses, capable of evaluating the impact of other 
explanatory variables.  
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heterogeneity of the performance that we would expect under the accumulative 
advantage hypothesis, particularly after appointment to full professor. For reasons of 
brevity, Table 8 provides only the results from the regressions relative to FSS. 
Beginning from the coefficients and the average marginal effects obtained from the Age 
variable, it seems evident that the research performance achieved by younger 
researchers at the moment of appointment to full professor is decidedly higher. 
Comparing two average researchers, one at age 45 and the other 65, we can readily 
calculate how the younger researcher has developed a performance that is 25 percentiles 
higher for FSS. This gap results as still stronger in some UDAs, such as Civil 
engineering, Economics and statistics, and Pedagogy and psychology, where a 
researcher aged 45 shows a performance that is on average 39, 36 and 35 percentiles 
higher compared to a colleague aged 65. The fact that the maximum performance gap is 
registered also in Civil engineering and Pedagogy and psychology, where we have 
previously noted a maximum negative impact from Age and a high positive impact from 
Seniority, seems to advance the hypothesis that the performances measured at 
promotion to full professor are not homogenous even within the same discipline, but 
tend to vary with Age. In substance, a younger candidate presents a higher level of 
performance than an older candidate17. This could be due to the fact that top performing 
young candidates climb faster the career ladder, while for the older candidates there is 
some recognition of the efforts they have made over a greater number of career years, or 
in areas different from publications in international journals. An alternative explanation 
could be that in the Italian system, evaluation for promotion considers the individual’s 
scientific production over a longer period than the five years of our analysis18. In any 
case, the presence of standards for promotion that are thus differentiated with respect to 
age can negatively affect the efficiency of the Italian university system, because they de 
facto render the role of full professor within the system less clear. If the promotion of a 
young and brilliant researcher can favor the growth of their university and discipline, 
while such individuals maintain and strengthen their productivity, including through the 
effects of “accumulated advantage”, then the promotion of a researcher at the close of 
their career gains little for the university system. The phenomena described, linked with 
other characteristic problems in the career advancement system, such as the alternating 
policy episodes of freezing and accelerating career advancement (Lissoni et al., 2011; 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003) and widespread favoritism (Abramo et al., 2014c; Perotti, 
2008), represent deficiencies and challenges still to be met, which hamper the 
achievement of full efficiency in the Italian university system. 
                                                          
17 Differently from the works by Lissoni et al. (2011) and Pezzoni et al. (2012), our analysis cannot 
demonstrate if young candidates to full professor positions are requested higher research performance 
than older ones. Our analysis only shows a gap of performance between young and old full professors at 
time of promotion.  
18 The fact of applying such strategies would be against the spirit of Italian law on academic promotion, 
which emphasizes among other considerations the importance of the candidate’s most recent scientific 
production. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Over recent decades, numerous studies have examined the relation between 
performance and age, stimulated largely by concerns over the progressive aging of 
university faculty now observed in many Western nations. In spite of the quantity of 
studies there are many cases of conflicting results, in part because of the different 
statistical methodologies applied, the different models for measuring research 
performance and the researchers’ age, and the difficulties in accounting for the roles of 
other explanatory variables that influence trends in productivity over the various stages 
of the researcher’s life cycle. 
The present study contributes to the debate on the relation between research 
performance and age, through a cross-sectional analysis of full professors’ performance 
in Italy. As compared to previous studies, our work presents several innovative 
elements, especially at the methodological level. First, in measuring performance we 
recur to a proxy of productivity which is more appropriate and reliable than indicators 
applied in prior literature: FSS in fact embeds both quantity and impact of publications 
and accounts for the contribution of each author to the publication. Second, differently 
from previous studies, we measure individual productivity as compared to that of peers 
in the same field, avoiding the distortions due to different intensity of publication across 
fields. Third, notwithstanding the limits of cross-sectional approaches, thanks to the 
measurement of relative performances, we are able to control for the changing research 
environment which can notably affect performance. Fourth, the focus on full professors 
allowed to control also for factors related to the presence of young assistant/associate 
professors, which affected several previous studies. Moreover, the focus on full 
professors should be of special interest for the decision maker, since they are 
responsible for the management of some critical resources for research and represent a 
"role model" for young academics (Pezzoni et al., 2012; Sands et al., 1991). 
Our analyses show that as age increases there is a high decline in full professors’ 
productivity which is measured, for the first time in studies on the subject, by an 
indicator that embeds both quantity and impact. This result is also confirmed through 
application of other performance indicators, such as number of articles and average 
impact of the individual’s publications, and is observed to different degrees in all the 
disciplines analyzed. Besides, our findings partially show that seniority within the rank 
of full professor bears positively on the researchers’ productivity. This evidence, 
especially in such disciplines as Biology, Chemistry and Medicine, seems to partially 
confirm the expectations of the accumulative advantage hypothesis, since productivity 
tends to be higher among those that have benefitted from more years of the increased 
resources that derive from full professor status, including accompanying experience and 
reputation. In substance, an individual who gains promotion to full professor at young 
age then maintains and increases his/her productivity more than colleagues who are 
promoted in later age. This mechanism can also be linked to the productivity differential 
recorded for these researchers at the moment of their promotion. In fact, our analyses 
show a relevant performance differential, especially in such disciplines as Civil 
engineering and Pedagogy and psychology, between older and younger researchers 
promoted in recent years. This differential could in turn depend on promotion 
mechanisms in the Italian system that tend to favor older researchers, since such a 
situation then demands less from them in terms of international publications, or at least 
permits consideration of the production they “accumulate” over an ample time period. 
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The monotonic negative relation between performance and age shown by our 
analysis is aligned to the results of other cross-sectional studies (Levin and Stephan, 
1989). Differently from some of them, we show that the negative relation holds true for 
all performance indicators employed. Other cross-sectional studies show a lower 
performance for the range of lower ages (Kyvik, 1990; Over, 1988; Stern, 1978), which 
is due to the fact that they observe any academic ranks. 
The upside-down U relation between performance and age is typical of findings in 
longitudinal studies (Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007). These studies cover the 
whole career progress of professors. Because of age, full professors tend to concentrate 
on the declining part of the upside-down U curve, which confirms the alignment with 
our results. In accordance with Turner and Mairesse (2005), we show also that post-
promotion productivity of full professors, who are nominated at young age, is higher 
than for their colleagues promoted in later age. This result can be explained by the 
accumulative advantage hypothesis, but also by a different level of performance at time 
of promotion to full professor. This phenomenon, detected through the analysis of 
professors promoted during the five-year period of observation, adds to the possible 
causes of performance differences between young and old full professors already 
observed in the literature. 
The evaluation of the productivity levels among the various age ranges can help 
inform the formulation of more adequate policies to manage the current and near-future 
development of the academic corps in a manner that ensures suitable growth in overall 
productivity. In the current Italian university system all professors are required to carry 
out both research and teaching. Each faculty member must provide a minimum of 350 
hours per year devoted to education. Salaries are regulated at the central level and are 
calculated according to academic rank and seniority. None of a professor’s salary 
depends on merit. Moreover, dismissal of unproductive professors is unheard of. 
While for assistant and associate professors career progress can have a strong 
motivational impact on their research performance, for full professors it does not apply. 
We do not observe, nor are we aware of other studies on the policies and initiatives that 
universities, in contexts such as the Italian one, have implemented to foster older 
professors’ low productivity or to direct a larger part of their time to activities other than 
research. We can think of dual contracts for professors, i.e. “research professors” and 
“teaching professors”, and/or monetary incentives based on research, teaching and 
managerial performances. Of course these schemes must account for the differences 
between male and female researchers and those belonging to different academic 
disciplines and types of universities, given that such differences are once again 
confirmed by the current analyses. 
The definition of such innovative policies, especially for a centralized university 
system as the Italian one, would require further analyses to confirm or correct the 
conclusions of the proposed study. To assist to that end, we now intend to broaden the 
temporal horizon of the performance analyses to clarify if the promotion of older 
researchers is indeed motivated by their observed long-term production. In addition, this 
type of study would also permit longitudinal-type analyses; permitting better distinction 
of the effects of the individual’s aging from other characteristic effects linked to his or 
her cohort of peers. In this way we could overcome one of the main limits of this work, 
which, being cross-sectional, is not able to disentangle age and cohort effects (Stephan, 
1996). Another useful broadening of the analysis would be to examine the academics of 
other ranks (assistant, associate professors), birthdates allotting, to have a complete 
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picture of the relations between productivity and age, also taking into account the 
bearing of promotion expectations on researcher performance. Finally, the availability 
of information on the date of promotion to higher academic ranks, would allow to better 
account for the accumulative advantage effect, 
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